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Influence of Postevent Information in the Recall of
Central and Peripheral Details of an Eyewitnessed
Event
Kathi Kaehler, Yvonne Larson, and Gloria Marmolejo
Winona State University
Previous research has shown that misleading postevent information can alter the report of a previously
witnessed event. The present experiment extends on this research by investigating whether central and peripheral
details are affected differentially by misleading postevent information. Sixty-four undergraduate students were
shown a series of slides depicting a theft from a convenience store. They were then exposed to a taped narrative
which contained some misinformation and some neutral information about two central and two peripheral
critical details. Finally, the subjects ' memory for the original event was tested using recognition and source
questions. The accuracy data replicated the misinformation effect p<.05. Central and peripheral details of the
original event were not affected differentially by the misinformation. The response latency results supported
Loftus 's substitution theory.

The Influence of Misleading Postevent
Information in the Recall of Central and Peripheral
Details of an Eyewitnessed Event.
Numerous studies have repeatedly demonstrated
that new information presented after witnessing an
event can cause changes in the ability to report that
event. When this new information is misleading, it
can cause errors in the accuracy of the eyewitnesses
report.
This phenomenon is known as the
misinformation effect.
Most of the research on the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony involves a three-stage
procedure (e.g., Belli, 1989: Lindsay, 1990; Lindsay
& Johnson, 1989; Loftus, Donders, Hoffman &
Schooler, 1989; Loftus, Weingardt & Lindsay, 1995;
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Tverskv & Tuchin,
1989). First, subjects witness a visual event. Next,
they receive verbal or written information that
includes either neutral or misleading information
about particular details of the original event.
Typically, subjects who are misinformed about a
detail report things that did not occur in the original
event (e.g., if the subjects see a Pepsi in the
witnessed event and then they hear 7-Up in the
postevent, the subjects may be more apt to report
that the 7-Up was in the original event). Although
there is little doubt that the misinformation effect can

be obtained, the interpretation of why it occurs has
gained less consensus.
Several theories have been proposed to account
for the misinformation effect. For example, Loftus
(e.g., Loftus et al.1989; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989;
proposed
the
Loftus
et
al.1995)
Substitution/Integration hypothesis which states that
when we receive misleading information about a
previously stored memory, we substitute and
integrate the new information with the old, thus
preventing access to the original information.
Although there has been a lack of distinction
between the integration (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson,
1989a; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989b) and the
substitution mechanisms (Belli, 1989) in the
literature, it is important to differentiate between the
two because they provide different explanations for
the misinformation effect. The integration theory
suggests that both memories for the original
information and the misleading postevent
information "integrate" thus resulting in a
conjunction or blend of both memories. However,
the substitution hypothesis predicts that the
misleading postevent information overwrites the
memory for the original event which thus prevents
access to the original information.
In contrast, according to the accessibility
hypothesis (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983), when new
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information Is presented the misleading postevent
information does not alter the' previously formed
memory; rather, the two memories coexist separately
with the most recent information (misleading
postevent) being the most accessible. Lindsay &
Johnson (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi &
Lindsay,1993;Linnsay,1990; Lindsay & Johnson,
1989) proposed a source-misattribution hypothesis
which states that the memories for both the original
and misleading postevent information also coexist,
but that subjects confuse the source of each memory.
Response bias can also influence the way a subject
responds (Christiansen & Ochalek, 1983). If the
subject assumes that the experimenter obviously
knows the content of the story, the subject many not
question the accuracy of the postevent information
and therefore, feel a pressure to report it regardless
of his/her memory for the original event.
What none of these explanations addresses is
whether misleading information affects all the details
of the original scene to the same degeee. It is not
clear whether someone can be misled not only about
details of secondary importance, but even on the
most critical details. Investigators working in the
area of reading comprehension have found
differences in the memorability of different aspects
of discourse. Readers' free-recall generally includes
the primary or more important details rather than the
secondary details. This difference between primary
and secondary details increases with the retention
interval between text reading and the recall test and
with the numbers of reproduction intents
(e.g.,Bartlett, 1932; Hunt & Love, 1972). Similarly,
it may be possible that when people witness an
event, the peripheral (secondary) details are
forgotten, thus allowing the misinformation to take
their place in memory. Because subjects' memory
about the event might be formed predominantly by
central (primary) details of the scene, central
features may be less affected by postevent
misinformation. This would imply that the reports of
details pertaining to the perpetrators of the crimes
may not be so accurate. Past research in eyewitness
testimony has shown one kind of dissociation;
arousal affects the recall of central and peripheral
details differentially (e.g., Christiansen & Loftus,
1987; Clifford & Scott, 1978; Deffenbacher,1983;
Leippe, Wells & Ostrom, 1978). For example,
Christiansen & Loftus (1987) have found that the
theme of a traumatic event (central detail) is
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remembered better than perpheral details.
Therefore, there is a reason to suspect that
misinformation also influences differentially the
details that have various degrees of relevance in the
original scene. This possibility would certainly
make the consequences of the misinformation effect
less aggravating in the court.
The purpose of the present experiment was
threefold: a) to investigate whether subjects'
memory for an eyewitnessed event is better for the
central (more important) details than for the
peripheral details, b) to find out whether misleading
postevent information affects central and peripheral
details differentially, and finally, c) to test between
the integration and substitution hypotheses and
contrast our results against the accessibility, source
monitoring, and bias hypotheses.
In order to investigate these questions, the
present experiment had subjects view a target event
and then listen to a taped narrative with postevent
information which was either neutral or misleading
about critical details. Lastly, the subjects were given
a memory test which consisted first of a recognition
yes/no question about a particular scene in the event
followed by a confidence rating for their answer.
Next, they were instructed to indicate the source
from where they remembered perceiving the item or
event, followed by a confidence rating for this source
answer. Then central and peripheral details in both
the slide and narrative combinations included these
four critical items: jacket, money, soda, box.
Because the thief and the items that he handled
formed the mail theme of the story, they were always
the central features. A maintenance man and the
items that he handled were always the peripheral
features. For example, a subject may have seen the
thief wearing a blue jacket stealing four twenty
dollar bills (cental details) while the maintenance
man may have been reaching for tools from a small
toolbox and then stopping momentarily to drink a
The opposite
Pepsi (peripheral details).
manipulation of this may have shown the thief
stealing a Pepsi using a small box to hide it (central
details) while the maintenance man was counting
four twenty dollar bills from his pants pocket and
wearing a blue jacket (peripheral details).
In order to differentiate between the integration
vs substitution hypotheses, besides including the
original and the misleading event as response
options, subjects were also given a blend or
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conjunction option and a totally novel option on the
memory test for the yes/no questions. For example,
if the original slide showed that the thief was
wearing a blue jacket and the misleading postevent
narrative reported that the thief was wearing a red
jacket, the memory test asked subjects to indicate
whether or not the thief was wearing: (a) a blue
jacket (original option), (b) a red jacket (misleading
option), (c) a purple jacket (conjunction option), and
(d) a yellow jacket (novel option). Because the
integration hypotheses predict that the memory for
both the original and misleading memory would be
combined thus resulting in a new integrated memory,
subjects that are misled about an item would be
predicted to choose this option (purple jacket)
significantly more than those subjects that receive
neutral information. Also, subjects would choose
the conjunction item more often than the totally new
item (yellow jacket). In contrast, because the
substitution hypothesis predicts that there would be
an "overwriting" of the original memory, the
conjunction option would not be selected. Instead,
the misleading postevent information would be
chosen (the red jacket). Also, subjects would be
expected to choose the substitution item more often
than the novel item (yellow jacket).
To reduce the likelihood of response bias,
subjects were warned that the information they heard
in the taped narrative may or may not have been an
accurate description of the slides. This was to
discourage subjects from choosing the postevent
option only because they assumed that the
experimenter's account expressed in the narrative
should be correct, regardless of their own memories.
By measuring response latencies and confidence
levels besides accuracy, the present experiment
compared and contrasted different predictions from
each of the other four hypotheses. First of all, it was
hypothesized (a) that central details would be
recalled better than peripheral details for both the
recognition and the source questions, (b) that central
details would be responded to faster than peripheral
details when measuring both recognition and source
reaction times. Finally it was hypothesized that (c)
subjects would be more confident about the central
than about the peripheral details of the eyewitnessed
event. The substitution, integration, accessibility,
and source hypotheses all predicted that subjects
should be less accurate when identifying critical

items in the misleading condition compared to the
control neutral condition.
In addition, both the substitution and the
integration hypotheses would expect subjects to be
equally fast and equally confident in both conditions,
because in both cases, there would be only one
memory. In contrast, according to the accessibility
hypothesis, subjects would respond faster to the
yes/no questions in the misleading condition than in
the neutral condition, because the misleading
postevent information, being the most recent, would
be more accessible. According to the sourcemisattribution hypothesis, subjects in the misleading
condition would be more accurate in the source
questions than in the yes/no recognition questions
because the original memory would still be
accessible after being misled when forced to focus
their attention on the source of each event.
However, subjects' responses would be slower in
the misleading condition in both the yes/no and the
source questions, because they would have to still
differentiate where each memory comes from at the
time of reading the question. Finally, according to
the response bias hypothesis, the misleading
condition should be equal to the neutral condition in
all responses. This is because we controlled for bias
by explicitly warning subjects about the possible
inaccuracy of the tapes narrative.
Method
Subjects
Sixty-four undergraduate students from two
Midwest colleges participated in this experiment to
earn extra credit for their psychology courses. The
subjects consisted of 45 females and 19 males with
an average age of 28 years old, who had a variety of
majors. All were native English-speakers and had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, as indicated
by a Snellen test applied at the beginning of the
experimental session.
Materials and Design
The original event consisted of a sequence of 41
color slides which depicted the following burglary
witnessed by a customer. A man entered a
convenience store. While shopping, he wandered
through the store, picked up a few items and
eventually stole either a soda or some dollar bills.
All the while a handyman was doing some
maintenance work. There were four versions of the
slides in which all but four slides were the same.
The four critical slides that changed, displayed one
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of two possible options: (a) soft drink (Pepsi or 7Up), (b) dollar bills (four $20 bills or eight $20
bills), (c) jacket color (red or blue), and (d) box size
(large cc small). One fourth of the subjects saw each
version of each critical item.
The postevent consisted of a professionally
taped narrative containing approximately 426 words.
It accurately described the details of the event except
for the critical items. For a given subject, the
narrative mentioned two critical items in a
misleading way and two in a neutral way. There
were 16 combinations of slide versions (1 to 4) and
postevent information (neutral or misinformation).
Four subjects were randomly assigned to each of the
16 slide-narrative combinations. Each critical item
appeared equally often as either a central or
peripheral detail. As an example, half of the
subjects saw the thief wearing the blue jacket
(central detail), whereas the other half saw the
maintenance man wearing the blue jacket (peripheral
detail). Each version of each of the critical items was
included in the control condition for half of the
subjects and in the misleading condition for the other
half. For example, from subjects who saw a blue
jacket on the thief in the slides, half received a
narrative referring to it as a red jacket (misleading
condition). Furthermore, for each version of each
critical item, the alternative version was used equally
often as misleading information. Except for the
necessary modifications with the critical items, the
narrative was the same for all subjects.
The subjects' memory was tested using a 55SX
IBM compatible computer attached to a color
monitor with a VGA adapter. The test was
programmed using a Schneider's (1990) Micro
Experimental Laboratory Program (MEL) software
package version 1.0. The subjects were presented
with explicit instructions about the test on the
screen. At that point, they were also warned that
some of the information that they had previously
heard in the narrative may or may not have been an
accurate description of the actual event. There were
four types of questions asked for each of the four
critical items and for each of the 21 noncritical
items. They consisted of a yes/no recognition
question, a source question, and two confidence
ratings (one for the yes/no recognition question and
one for the source question), therefore yielding a
total of 100 questions.
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The experiment utilized a 2x2 within subjects
design. The independent variables were the type of
postevent narrative with misleading or neutral as the
two levels, and item relevance with the two levels
being central or peripheral. Therefore, there were
four experimental conditions, with two different
critical items in each. The dependent measures were
accuracy, reaction time, and response confidence for
the recognition and source questions.
Procedure
The subjects were told that the experiment was
concerned about the effectiveness of visual, verbal,
The
and numerical modes of presentation.
experiment consisted of five parts with instructions
presented before each stage. The slides were
presented at a rate of 5 seconds per slide.
Immediately after viewing the slides, the subjects
were engaged in an unrelated 5 to 7-min math filler
Specifically, they were required to
activity.
complete several multiplication and division
problems to keep them from rehearsing what they
saw in the slide sequence. They then listened to a 2min taped narrative describing the event they
witnessed in the slides. After another 5 to 7-min
math filler activity to prevent rehearsal of what was
heard in the narrative, the subjects began the test
phase of the experiment.
The test consisted of four types of questions
about each of the 25 items. Therefore, there were
100 questions, 16 of which were about critical items
and 84 that were about noncritical items. The
subjects were instructed to answer each question as
quickly and as accurately as possible. The word
"Ready" preceded each set of questions so that the
subjects would know where to fixate their gaze. The
subjects were then first given a yes/no recognition
question, regarding the items that were presented to
them in the slides. The task of the subjects was to
press the blue key on the keyboard for a "yes"
response or the red key for a "no" response (e.g.,
Was the thief wearing a blue jacket?). The YES and
NO keys were designated by sticking a colored label
on the / and z keys on the bottom row of the
keyboard. The subjects were also given a question
about the source where they remembered perceiving
the item they were to respond by pressing the
numerical keys (1=slide, 2=narrative, 3=both,
4=neither) at the right side of the keyboard (e.g.,
Where do you remember perceiving the item or
event from?). After each of these questions, the
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subject entered his/her confidence about the selected
answer on a 5-point rating scale, where 1=absolutely
confident and 5=absolutely unsure. The response
latency and the accuracy of the responses were
registered by the computer for each trial. The
students were required to complete a series of six
practice trials to ensure that they understood the
available options and were correctly answering the
questions. Each experimental session lasted
approximately 70 minutes.
Results
The data obtained in the yes/no recognition and
the source questions were analyzed separately,
pooled over three of the four critical items. The
"box" item was excluded due to subjects' report
about the subjectiveness of its size (small vs large).
Yes/No recognition test. Figure la shows the
accuracy data on the yes/no recognition memory test.
As can be observed, subjects were significantly less
accurate when identifying the critical items in the
misleading condition (M=.665) than in the control
condition (M=.805), F(1,63) = 40.42, p-0.000.
Therefore, not surprisingly, the misinformation effect
was replicated. However, the central items were not
recalled significantly better than the peripheral
items, F(1,63) = 0.67, p>.05. The interaction
between narrative and relevance was not significant

either, F(1,63) = 0.01, p>.05.
6
Figure 2a shows the reaction time data for the
yes/no questions The results showed that subjects
responded equally fast in both the misleading
(M=3.70s) and control (M=3.417s) conditions,
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Figure 1 - Mean response accuracy as a function of neutral
and misleading postevent information regarding central and
peripheral details (a) in the yes/no recognition questions, and
(b) in the source questions.

F(1,63) = 1.06, p>.05. Thus, we have no evidence
to support neither the accessibility nor the source
misattribution hypotheses. These hypotheses imply
that misinformation produces a conflict that must be
resolved during recall on the memory test, thus
resulting in longer reaction times for the misleading
condition.
In order to test the integration vs. substitution
hypothesis, the postevent ( neutral) information and
the four response options (original, misleading,
conjunction, new) were submitted to a 2x4 within
subjects ANOVA. The results indicated a main
effect of postevent, F(3,189)=16.32, a main effect of
response option, F(3,189)=104.80, and a postevent
by response option interaction, F(3,189)=29.73,
p--0.000. More specifically, the number of times that
people selected the misleading option in the
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misleading condition (M=.69) was significantly
greater than in the control condition (M=.09),
F(1,63)=.69, p=.05. Misled subjects selected the
misinformation option (M=.69) as often as the
original event option (M=.61) and both significantly
more often than the conjunction option (M=.14),
F(1,63)=55.16, p=0.000, while never selecting the
totally novel option (M=.00). Therefore, as can be
1 40
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sl eadi ng
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Figure 3 - Probability of a "yes" response for each of the four
response options as affected by neutral and misleading
postevent information.

observed in Figure 3, these results tend to support
the substitution hypothesis over the integration
hypothesis.
Regarding response latency as a
function of item relevance, there was a significant
relevance by postevent interaction, F(1,63)=3.88,
p=.05. In the misled condition, subjects responded
significantly slower to peripheral details (M=4.29s)
than in the control condition (M=3.45s). However,
for the central details, subjects responded equally
fast in both the misleading (M=3.11s) and the
control (M=3.38s) conditions, F(1,63)=3.88, p=.05.
Finally, the statistical analysis of the confidence
ratings for the yes/no recognition test indicated that
subjects were significantly more confident in their
responses in the misleading condition (M=1,30) than
in the control condition (M=1.50), F(1,63)=7.40,
p=.008. Likewise, subjects who responded
incorrectly were more confident about the peripheral
details (M=1.64) than about the central details
(M2.19), F(1.63)=40.39, p0.000. This pattern of
results is hard to explain by any of the theories on
the misinformation effect.
Source test. Figure lb shows that subjects were
significantly less accurate in the source memory test
regarding misleading items (M=.437) than neutral
items =.518), F(1,63)=8.26, p<.01. However, as
Figure 2b indicates, subjects responded equally fast
in the misleading condition (M=3.012s) and the
control condition (M=3.00s), F(1,63)=.012, p>.05.
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These results do not support the source
misattribution theory, which would claim that misled
subjects would have a longer reaction time in the
misleading condition, because they have to spend
time differentiating the source of each memory.
Furthermore, misled subjects' accuracy in the source
test was significantly lower (M 0.48) than in the
yes/no recognition test
CI.79), F(1,63)=5.5,
p<.05. This result does not support the source
misattribution hypothesis either. According to this
explanation, there is a memory trace for the original
and one for the postevent information. The
misleading effect results from a confusion in the
source of each memory. However, if the witness'
attention is directed toward the source at the time of
retrieval, they can accurately recover the original
memory. This would result in higher accuracy for the
source than for the yes/no recognition test, which is
opposite to our findings.
Finally, the analysis on source test confidence
revealed that subjects were equally confident in both
the misleading condition=1.81) and the control
condition (M=1.50), F(1,63)=1.03, p>.05.
However, by separately analyzing the correct
responses, subjects were significantly less confident
in the misleading condition (M=2.75) than in the
control condition (M=1.58) ,F(1,63)=4.77, p= 03.
For the incorrect responses, subjects in the control
condition were significantly more confident about
peripheral details (M=1.40) than about the central
details (M=1.64); whereas, in the misleading
condition, the relevance of the details did not
influence the confidence ratings, F(1,63)=4.90,
p=.03.
Two final one-way ANOVAs were computed to
check the equivalence in memorability of the four
slide sequences and the sixteen taped narratives.
Subjects accuracy did not significantly differ across
the particular slide sequence that the observers
watched and the narrative that they heard, p>.05,
except for one slide sequence.
Discussion
In summary, this research yielded three
important findings. First, consistent with past
research, the misinformation effect was replicated
since subjects were much less accurate on the
recognition questions when they were misled than
when they were not_ Second, our research seemed to
indicate that central and peripheral details of an
eyewitnessed event were either recalled differentially

MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES SPRING 1997

Misleading Effect in Central and Peripheral Details
or affected by misinformation in a different manner.
One possible explanation for the obtained results is
that in fact, eyewitnesses recalled all details with
equal accuracy. An alternative explanation is that
misinformation affected different items differentially.
That is, for some items, being a central part of the
story made them less susceptible to misinformation
than being peripheral. However, other items showed
the opposite pattern, and thus canceled each other
out in the averages. Another possibility may have
been the differences in the quality of the slides that
the subjects viewed. Some slides were lighter than
others and this may have influenced what the
subjects remembered seeing. This was especially
evident after further analysis indicated that subjects'
accuracy across the particular slide sequences that
they watched differed significantly, which resulted in
poorer accuracy of one of the four slide sequences.
Future research would need to control for this by
duplicating slides with the exact amount of lighting
in each.
Third, out of all the proposed theories to explain
the misinformation effect, the substitution hypothesis
gain the most support. First of all, the bias
hypothesis (e.g., Christiansen & Ochalek, 1983) was
not supported because subjects were not equally
accurate even though bias was eliminated or at least
greatly reduced in our experiment. The integration
hypothesis (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; 1989b)
was not supported either because subjects did not
choose the conjunction option significantly more
often in the misinformation condition than in the
control condition. Likewise, no evidence was found
for the accessibility hypothesis (e.g., Bekerian &
Bowers, 1983) since subjects responded to the item
questions equally fast in both the misleading and
control conditions. Subjects were not faster at
reporting the postevent because of being more recent
and accessible.
The results did not support the source
misattribution hypothesis either (e.g.,Lindsay &
Johnson, 1989; Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay,
1993; Lindsay, 1990), since subjects responded
equally fast to the source test in the misleading and
the control condition, and also because subjects in
the misleading condition were much less rather than
more accurate on the source test in comparison to
the recognition test. In contrast, the substitution
theory (e.g.,Belli, 1989) was upheld because
subjects responded equally fast to the item yes/no

questions. This suggests that subjects only had one
memory at the time of the test. In addition, subjects
in the misleading condition reported witnessing the
misleading items significantly more often than the
original, conjunction, and new response options.
However, future research is needed to address a
problem with the source questions. It appeared that
when subjects responded to these questions, they did
not use all of their options and maybe misunderstood
their meanings despite a thorough explanation. It
would be interesting to see if the same effect could
be obtained using different wording to ask the source
questions.
Taken together, this research implies that a
witness to a crime can actually be influenced by
misleading postevent information. The reason for
this influence, as found in our research, seems to he
that once people are confronted with conflicting
information, they are no longer able to access what
was originally witnessed even when made to focus
on the source of both the original and postevent
information. This may therefore lead to a report
which may contain false information. These findings
may be considered devastating, especially
considering the fact that someone can be convicted
based solely on eyewitnesses testimony.
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